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THE ACID RAIN AMENDMENTS AND THE




John Agar, Jerry L. Pfeffer and Joseph V Vasapoli *
I. INTRODUCTION
HE new acid rain title of the Clean Air Act' could pose significant
problems for the financing of non-public utility fossil fueled electric
generator projects, including so-called qualifying cogeneration facili-
ties (QFs) and independent power projects (IPPs).2 This segment of the
electric utility industry, which has been the nation's cleanest, most efficient
producer of electric energy while providing a competitive alternative to elec-
* Mr. Agar and Mr. Vasapoli are attorneys at the Washington, D.C. office of Skadden,
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, specializing in environmental law and legislative practice, re-
spectively. Mr. Pfeffer is an Energy Industries Adviser at Skadden, Arps' Washington, D.C.
office.
1. Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963), Title IV, as added by The Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549,-Stat.- (1990).
2. Qualifying cogeneration facilities (QFs) must meet efficiency and operating standards
as prescribed by Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regulations. See 18 C.F.R.
§ 292.205 (1990). These criteria "carry the burden of assuring that QFs mode of generation is
socially desirable," that is, is efficient and innovative. FERC Docket No. RM 88-6-000, IV
F.E.R.C. Statutes & Regulations 32,457 at 32,163 (March 16, 1988). See also infra text
accompanying notes 39-40 (discussing cogeneration). Independent power projects (IPP's) are
non-QF wholesale producers that are unaffiliated with franchised utilities in their market area
and lack significant market power. IPP's do not possess transmission facilities and do not sell
power in any retail service area in which they have a franchise. FERC Docket No. RM88-4-
000, IV F.E.R.C. Statutes & Regulations 32,456 at 32,103 (March 16, 1988) (providing de-
tailed description of an IPP). Under proposed FERC regulations, a non-QF IPP sells electric
energy produced by a facility that is not regulated on a cost-of-service basis, Le., is not
regulated as a public utility to ensure investors a reasonable return on their investments. 53
FED. REG. 9328 (1988) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. § 38.103(b),(k)) (proposed March 16,
1988). See also FERC Docket No. RM88-4-000, IV F.E.R.C. Statutes & Regulations
32,456 at 32,110 (March 16, 1988) (providing expanded discussion). QFs can also include so-
called small power production facilities, which use as their primary fuel biomass, waste, renew-
able resources, geothermal resources, or any combination thereof. 18 C.F.R.
§ 292.204(a)(l),(3)(b)(l)(i) (1990). Until recently, small power production facilities could not
be QF's if they exceeded 80 megawatts in size. The Solar, Wind, Waste, and Geothermal
Power Production Incentives Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-575 (1990) has abolished this re-
quirement unless FERC reinstates it by rule. Pub. L. No. 101-575, § 4. Since small power
production facilities are not fossil-fueled, they are not subject to the emissions allowance provi-
sion of the Amendments.
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tric public utility generation, 3 has flourished largely as a result of initiatives
of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) that stem from the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA).4 One of a number
of laws passed on the same day in response to the energy crisis of the late
1970s,5 PURPA has helped change the face of an industry once dominated
by quasi-monopolistic public utilities. Recent events in the Middle East have
again focused attention on the vulnerability of the nation's energy supply
and accentuated the continuing relevance of policies related to the goals of
PURPA.6
The creation of potential hurdles to the financing of non-public utility gen-
erators 7 is an unintentional result s of the ambitious objective of title IV,
which mandates drastic reductions in emissions of acid rain precursors9
from the fossil fuel-fired electric generating industry10 by means of stringent
emissions limitations enforced in part through an "allowance" system.
Under this system, fossil fuel-fired electric plants will be permitted to emit
sulfur dioxide ("SO2") only to the extent that they have obtained "al-
lowances" to do so. 1I As of January 1, 2000, the date on which most non-
public utility generators that commence commercial operation after Novem-
ber 15, 1990, will begin to be regulated under title IV, 12 the number of al-
3. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1989, Report of the Committee on Environment
and Public Works, United States Senate, on S. 1630, S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
296 (1989) (cogeneration plants can achieve 85-90% efficiency compared to 33% for current
power plants); see also 45 FED. REG. 12214, 12215 (1980) (FERC preamble to 18 C.F.R. Part
292 implementing section 210 of PURPA) (final rule).
4. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117.
5. Laws passed the same day as PURPA include the Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (1988); the
National Energy Conservation Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 8201 (1988); the Powerplant and In-
dustrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 8301 (1988); and the Natural Gas Policy Act of
1978, 15 U.S.C. 3301 (1988).
6. In enacting PURPA, Congress found that the programs authorized by the act were
needed, among other things, to encourage increased conservation of electric energy and in-
creased efficiency in the production of electric energy. See FERC Docket No. RM88-5-000,
IV F.E.R.C. Proposed Regs. 32,455 at 32,049 n.7 (March 16, 1988).
7. Under the terminology of title IV, "utility units" are regulated, and the term "utility
unit" is defined broadly enough to include most fossil fuel-fired QFs and IPPs. See title IV,§ 402(17). For clarity in this article, we distinguish franchised public utilities from QF's and
IPP's. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(e) (defining "public utility"); see also FERC Docket No. RM88-4-
000, IV F.E.R.C. Statutes & Regulations 32,456 at 32,135 nn. 4,5 (March 16, 1988) (distin-
guishing a public utility from an IPP).
8. A search of the legislative history of title IV produces no evidence of a Congressional
intent to discourage construction of IPP and QF facilities.
9. Title IV regulates emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NO.). SO2
results from the burning of fossil fuels, which contain sulfur. As the S02 is emitted into the
atmosphere, it combines with oxygen to form SO4. When SO4 settles out of the air, it attracts
water, which converts it into H2SO4, sulfuric acid. Similarly, nitrogen in fossil fuels combines
with oxygen during burning to form oxides of nitrogen, which eventually can combine with
water to produce HNO3, nitric acid. S. REP. 228 at 261-62.
10. Electric public utilities accounted for two-thirds of the SO 2 emissions in the United
States in 1987. Interim Report, National Energy, 128 (Department of Energy 1990), citing
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, National Air Pollutant Emission Estimates, 1940-87
(1989).
11. 1990 Amendment §§ 403, 408.
12. 1990 Amendment §§ 403(e), 405(g)(C).
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lowances will be strictly limited to ensure reductions in emissions by nearly
fifty percent from 1980 levels. 13 New non-public utility generators (and new
generating units of utilities) will be required to obtain allowances, to the
extent they are available, by purchasing them in one of a number of emission
allowance "markets" envisaged by title IV. 14
The need to purchase emission allowances in the future may pose signifi-
cant problems for the financing of many QF and IPP projects that are pro-
jected to come on-line during the 1990s. These problems stem from the fact
that both the availability and the price of the allowances that will be required
will be difficult to determine with any precision at the time of a project's
financial closing. These problems are of particular concern because the de-
velopment of non-public utility generators for the foreseeable future will be
undertaken largely through project financing mechanisms. In a project fi-
nancing, the lender relies upon project revenue, rather than the creditworthi-
ness of the project developer, to assure debt service. 15 Consequently, the
lender must be assured that the project will go on-line on schedule and pro-
duce an income stream sufficient to meet the project's debt service.
Uncertainties as to the availability and cost of allowances pose at least two
significant threats to non-public utility projects. First, an insufficient
amount of allowances will serve to limit output and thus reduce the revenue
stream available for debt service. Second, assuming that sufficient al-
lowances are available, it is not clear that sales agreements will provide for
an automatic flow-through of the costs incurred by a non-public utility gen-
erator in obtaining emission allowances to assure uninterrupted operation
throughout the life of the project. From a lender's perspective, such uncer-
tainties present unprecedented issues of cost exposure, including the degree
of risk that may be incurred and how such risks can be "hedged."
These potential adverse effects on project financing of non-public utility
generators are similar to problems seemingly resolved by PURPA and rele-
vant FERC decisions. Prior to 1978, project financing for cogeneration
plants was problematic because traditional regulated electric utilities were
often unwilling to provide a firm market for non-public utility generated
electric energy, including some degree of indexing of the price paid to the
non-public utility generator to reflect variations in fuel costs. 16 Non-public
utility electric generator projects often could not obtain financing because
their revenue stream could not be assured. The passage of PURPA helped
create a viable non-public utility generating industry by requiring utilities to
purchase from qualifying cogenerators. 17
It would be a strange and unfortunate twist in the development of the
13. See Clean Air Amendments of 1990, Report of the Committee on Energy and Com-
merce, United States House of Representatives on H.R. 9030, H.R. REP. No. 490 (Part 1),
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 355 (1990).
14. See 1990 Amendment § 403(e).
15. The Amendments require the Secretary of Energy to define the term "nonrecourse
project-financed" by February 15, 1991. 1990 Amendment § 416(a)(2)(B).
16. See 45 Fed. Reg. 12214, 12215 (February 25, 1980).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 43-54.
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non-public utility generation industry if difficulties in obtaining, or recoup-
ing the cost of, allowances resurrected barriers to the construction and oper-
ation of non-public utility generating plants. Such a result would frustrate, if
not effectively reverse, a hitherto successful Federal policy of encouraging
the development of a robust non-public utility generator industry - a policy
premised upon several objectives, including, ironically, enhancement of the
environment.
A. The New Acid Deposition Cleanup Program
Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments utilizes two complementary
approaches to reduce SO2 emissions from fossil-fueled electric generating
units: stringent emissions limitations on sources, combined with a marketa-
ble allowance system.' 8 An allowance is defined as an authorization to emit
one ton of SO 2 during or after a specified calendar year. 19 Plants subject to
title IV will be allowed to emit only those amounts of SO2 for which they
have allowances. 20 New plants will generally have to obtain allowances
from existing plants that received a free allocation of allowances and reduced
their SO2 emissions below the required number of allowances.
Under title IV, beginning in the year 2000 the total tonnage of allowances
for fossil fuel-fired steam electric generating units will be permanently
capped at 8.9 million tons of SO 2.2 1 The EPA is directed to make annual
distributions of the bulk of these allowances free of charge to existing genera-
tors.22 For new plants that do not receive an allocation of allowances from
the EPA, the primary source of allowances is expected to be existing high-
emitting units (primarily those on a list of 110 designated plants) 23 that are
able to make more cost-effective emissions reductions than required and are
willing to sell their extra allowances to plants that require them.24 Addition-
ally, title IV creates a number of small EPA-administered allowance
"reserves." Funded from the original allocations, these reserves are
designed to meet certain contingencies and to keep the allowance market
fluid.2 5 From the most significant of these reserves, the EPA is authorized to.
18. See S. REP. 228 at 322-23. With minor limitations, allowances are transferable among
owners and operators of utilities and other persons. 1990 Amendment §§ 403(b), 410. "In
fact, ownership of allowances by brokers, investors and other market makers will maintain
fluidity in the allowance market, link ultimate utility buyers with original sellers and facilitate
rational price-finding." S. REP. 228 at 320.
19. 1990 Amendment § 402(3).
20. 1990 Amendment §§ 404, 405, 408.
21. 1990 Amendment § 403(a). But see § 405(a)(3), adding 50,000 additional Phase II
allowances to the allocations of certain phase I units. Allowances may also be created under
the opt-in provisions of § 410. See infra note 22.
22. 1990 Amendment §§ 402(28), 402(29), 403, 405. In addition, industrial sources (who
are otherwise exempt from the acid rain provisions of the legislation) may "opt-in" to the
program and "create" allowances by reducing emissions from an operating facility on a volun-
tary basis. Id. § 410. Thus, for example, an industrial cogenerator could take credit for shut-
ting down an existing steam boiler and apply a portion of the emission allowances thereby
created to a cogeneration facility.
23. See 1990 Amendment § 404, Table A.
24. S. REP. 228 at 318.
25. S. REP. 228 at 325.
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sell up to 50,000 allowances a year on a first-come, first-served basis for
$1500 each, adjusted for inflation. 26
Existing plants that receive allowances will also be subject to stringent
emissions limitations. Certain specified plants, which are large, high-rate
emitters of SO 2, will be required to reduce their emissions to a rate no
greater than 2.5 pounds per million British thermal units of fossil fuel con-
sumed ("lbs/MMBtu") by January 1, 1995.27 This initial reduction require-
ment is referred to as the Phase I period. 28 These plants subsequently will be
required to further reduce their emissions to a rate no greater than 1.2
lbs/MMBtu, by January 1, 2000.29 This is referred to as the Phase II reduc-
tion period. 30 Phase II will also require existing plants which currently emit
S02 at a rate less than 2.5 lbs/MMBtu to achieve reductions; they will be
required to reduce their emissions to the 1.2 lbs/MMBtu level or below,
depending on factors specified in section 405, by January 1, 2000. 31
Most fossil fuel steam plants that commence operation between October 1,
1990 and December 31, 1995, are also classified as existing Phase II units,
but will be subject to a lower emissions limit. 32 These plants will be permit-
ted to emit S02 at a rate no greater than 0.30 lbs/MMBtu computed at a
65% capacity factor following commencement of the Phase II period.33
B. The Non-Public Utility Electric Generating Industry
New capacity in the non-public utility steam electric generating industry
consists primarily of qualifying cogeneration production plants, which have
flourished as a result of sections 201 and 210 of PURPA3 4 and correspond-
ing FERC regulations, 3 5 and IPPs, which have received favorable regulatory
treatment in a series of FERC decisions in recent years. 36 QFs were given a
favored status by PURPA, because they represent a cleaner, more efficient
source of electric energy than the traditional public utility steam electric
generator.37 The success of QFs has contributed to the current market for
IPPs, which in many cases have proved to be more efficient electricity pro-
ducers than traditional utilities.38
26. 1990 Amendment § 416(b), (c). The amendments also create a special fund for new
IPPs. § 416(c)(3),(4).
27. 1990 Amendment § 404 and § 404 Table A.
28. 1990 Amendment § 404.
29. 1990 Amendment § 405(b).
30. 1990 Amendment § 405.
31. While the bill does not impose any additional emissions standards on new plants (i.e.
those not grandfathered or exempt), such plants still will be required to comply with all ex-
isting state and federal laws, including the New Source Performance Standards. See 40 C.F.R.
Part 60 (1990).
32. 1990 Amendment § 405(g)(3),(4).
33. Id.
34. 16 U.S.C. §§ 796 and 824a-3 (1988).
35. See 18 C.F.R. Part 292 (1990).
36. See Doswell Limited Partnership, Doc. No. ER90-80-O0 (February 28, 1990) and
cases cited therein.
37. See supra note 6.
38. FERC Docket No. RM88-4-000, IV F.E.R.C. Statutes & Regulations 32,456 at
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Cogeneration is the production of electric energy and useful thermal en-
ergy (typically steam) through the sequential use of energy.39 Typically,
QFs are small facilities relative to traditional regulated electric utilities, be-
cause, as a practical matter, they require a nearby industrial facility that can
utilize the produced thermal energy. The industrial facility usually contracts
to purchase a significant percentage of the plant's electric energyA0
Although cogenerators supply electricity primarily to a single industrial
user, variations in usage and in the cogenerator's ability to produce electric-
ity mean that to be economically viable, the cogenerator must have the abil-
ity to sell or purchase electricity at favorable rates from larger electric
utilities. An IPPs technology ranges from those utilized in existing public
utilities to highly innovative fossil-fuel technologies that do not fall within
the rubric of cogeneration.4 1 IPPs sell their output wholesale to utilities.4 2
Because PURPA (combined with a variety of cost factors) was instrumen-
tal in creating the market conditions for IPPs as well as for QFs,43 a brief
discussion of the reasons for the enactment of PURPA will be helpful in
understanding the potential impact of the Clean Air Amendments on the
non-public utility steam electric industry. Prior to the passage of PURPA,
two main problems had to be resolved before the financing of a cogeneration
project was likely to proceed. First, traditional electric public utilities were
reluctant to purchase power from non-public utility generators, whom they
perceived as rivals. 44 Second, some utilities charged discriminatorily high
rates for back-up power to such generators.4 5
PURPA and FERC regulations address these problems" by requiring
regulated electric utility companies to purchase electricity from, and sell
electricity to, QFs, and to make any interconnections required for such
purchases or sales. 471n addition, FERC regulations generally require the reg-
ulated utility to purchase the QFs energy at a preferential rate that is equal
to the costs the public utility avoids by not having to produce electric energy
32,115-116 (March 16, 1988). IPPs may include subsidiaries or affiliates of public utilities
offering electricity outside their parent's service territory. See id. at 1 32,112-115.
39. See 18 C.F.R. § 292.202(c) 1990.
40. Many cogeneration facilities are constructed on land leased from a host industrial
facility. Often, the host facility retires some or all of its boiler capacity when the cogeneration
facility goes on line.
41. FERC Docket No. RM88-4-000, IV F.E.R.C. Statutes and Regulations 32,456 at
§ 32,116 and nn. 105-06 (March 16, 1988).
42. See supra note 2.
43. See FERC Docket No. RM88-4-000, IV F.E.R.C. Statutes & Regulations 32,456 at
32,105.106 (March 16, 1988).
44. See 45 Fed. Reg. 12214, 12215 (1980) (FERC preamble to 18 C.F.R., pt. 292) (final
rule); Fed. Energy. Reg. Comm'n. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 750 (1982).
45. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n., 456 U.S. at 750.
46. PURPA and FERC regulations also address a third problem - that a QF "which
provided electricity to a [public] utility's grid ran the risk of being considered an electric utility
and thus being subjected to State and Federal regulation as an electric utility." 45 Fed. Reg. at
12215; see H.R. REP. No. 1750 H.R. 4018, H. REP. No., 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7659, 7797. Under 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e), the
FERC may exempt QFs from certain regulations applying to traditional electric utilities. In
1990, the FERC promulgated exemption regulations at 18 C.F.R., pt. 292, subpart F.
47. 18 C.F.R. § 292.303(a)-(c)(1990).
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supplied by the QF.48 At the same time, the FERC regulations enable the
QF to purchase from the regulated utility at the same rate as the public
utility's other customers with similar load or other cost-related
characteristics.49
In effect, traditional electric public utilities are required to subsidize QFs,
which receive any difference between their own cost and the avoided cost
rate.50 Indeed, the regulation enables the QF to separate the production
aspect of its facility from its consumption aspect, 51 so that a QF can simulta-
neously sell electric energy to a regulated utility at a rate based on avoided
costs, and purchase from the same utility at the ordinary retail rate.52 The
purpose of allowing the QF to obtain economic rent for the production of
electric energy is to fulfill the Congressional mandate of encouraging
cogeneration. 53 By all measures, the regulations have been successful. 54
The success of QFs in meeting the energy needs of electric utilities has led
recently to the proliferation of IPPs, which have been favored by a series of
decisions by the FERC in which these non-public utility sellers of power
have been allowed to depart significantly from the traditional cost-of-service
standard in establishing rates for power sales. 55 The issuance of a proposed
regulation on IPPs, 56 which has been substantively reflected though never
48. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304. The regulation states generally that the rate for purchases from
a QF by a regulated utility satisfies the requirements of the PURPA "if the rate equals the
[purchaser's] avoided costs. ... Id. § 292.304(b)(2). The term avoided costs means "the
incremental costs to an electric utility of electric energy or [production] capacity which, but
for the purchase from the qualifying facility or qualifying facilities, such utility would generate
itself or purchase from another source." 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(6). Energy costs are the "va-
riable costs associated with the incremental production of electric energy .... They represent
the cost of fuel, and some operating and maintenance expenses." Capacity costs "may be
incurred by a utility in order to build generating facilities, institute conservation and load
management programs, or purchase power on the wholesale market." FERC Docket No.
RM88-6-000, IV F.E.R.C. Statutes & Regulations 1 32,457 at 32,163 (March 16, 1988). The
term "incremental" emphasizes that rates for purchases must reflect the costs of obtaining
energy from highest cost units, such as those that are turned on last, and the costs of obtaining
new capacity. Purchase rates based on avoided costs are higher than rates based on average
system costs for energy or average embedded system cost for capacity. 45 Fed. Reg. at 12216.
The Supreme Court upheld 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(b)(2) in American Paper Inst. v. American
Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 413-17 (1983).
49. 18 C.F.R. § 292.305.
50. See FERC Docket No. RM88-6-000, IV F.E.R.C. Statutes & Regulations 32,457 at
32,163 (March 16, 1988).
51. 45 Fed. Reg. 12214, 12223 (1980) (FERC preamble to 18 C.F.R., pt. 292) (final rule).
52. Id.
53. Id.; see H. R. REP. No. 95-1750 at 98, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
Naws at 7831.
54. Through the mid-1980s electric capacity added under PURPA has far outstripped
combined capacity added by investor-and publicly-owned electric utilities. U.S. Dep't. of En-
ergy, Energy Security: A Report to the President of the United States 129, 157 (1987). See also
FERC Docket No. RM88-6-000, IV F.E.R.C. Statutes & Regulations 32,457 at 32,186 n.42
(Mar. 16, 1988) (by 1985, nearly five times as much capacity had been added under PURPA as
FERC had predicted in 1980).
55. E.g., Commonwealth Atlantic, 51 FERC 61,368 (1990); Enron Power Enter., 52
FERC $ 61,193 (1990).
56. See FERC Docket No. RM88-4-000, IV F.E.R.C. Statutes and Regulations 32,456
(notice of proposed rulemaking on regulation of IPPs.
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adopted in several individual cases, 57 foreshadowed this policy.
C. How The New Acid Deposition Cleanup Program Will Impact the
Financing of Non-Public Utility Generators
As the legislative history of the Clean Air Amendments makes clear, the
stringent emissions reductions, the permanent cap on emissions and the mar-
ketability of emission allowances are part of an integrated program to en-
courage fossil fuel-fired electric generators to reduce S0 2 emissions below
mandated requirements. 58 The centerpiece of this program is the allowance
system, which is designed to provide a profit incentive for the regulated in-
dustry to reduce emissions. 59 Unfortunately, the legislation does not address
a number of questions concerning the impact of this regulatory regime upon
the continued viability of PURPA/FERC policies that have helped stabilize
project financing for the non-public utility steam electric generator industry.
The amendments pose a number of potentially serious problems for pro-
ject financing of QFs and IPPs. First, it is not clear that adequate al-
lowances will be available for developers of new plants, regardless of price.6°
There is reason to fear that public utilities and their state regulators will
hoard excess allowances generated within a given state to accommodate fu-
ture growth within that jurisdiction, rather than selling these allowances to
out-of-state utilities and developers. 6' There are also concerns that public
utilities will transfer such allowances to their unregulated generating subsidi-
aries, thereby providing their affiliates with a competitive advantage in rela-
tion to non-public utility developers. 62
Moreover, even if allowances are obtainable by non-public utility genera-
tors, the question of who will bear the ultimate burden of paying for them is
unclear. If non-public utilities are allowed to flow through their cost of al-
lowances to the public utility purchaser, the public utility is in effect buying
back allowances it previously generated and sold. This result might under-
mine the incentive provided by title IV to create excess allowances. Yet, if
57. See supra note 55.
58. S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 279 (1989).
59. In fact, the report states that "allowances are intended to function like currency that
is sufficiently valuable to stimulate efforts to acquire it through innovative and aggressive ef-
forts to reduce emissions more than required." See S. REP. No. 228 at 324. The amendments
make clear, however, that an allowance is not a property protected under the Constitution.
1990 Amendment § 403(f).
60. The amount of allowances required and the corresponding costs will be considerably
greater for coal versus gas-fired projects of a similar scale. This is because coal has a much
greater sulfur content than natural gas. See S. REP. No. 228 at 292-93. Thus, from a project
financing perspective, lenders may view new coal-fired projects as posing a somewhat higher
degree of risk in that the uncertain costs of obtaining such allowances could jeopardize cash
flow available for debt service. It is unclear, however, whether the greater certainty relating to
future coal prices would tend to offset some of these lender concerns as compared with the
much greater potential variability in future natural gas prices.
61. See "EPA Officials Predict Tough Time Ahead in Meeting Clean Air Bill Regulatory
Schedule," 21 ENV'T REP. 429, 430 (BNA) (July 6, 1990) (reporting that the Florida Public
Utilities Commission has forbidden state utilities from selling allowances to out-of-state
utilities).
62. S. REP. No. 228 at 325-26.
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such costs cannot be flowed through, the non-public utility generator indus-
try will in effect be partially subsidizing the public utility industry. This
result would be inconsistent with both PURPA and with the goal of main-
taining economic incentives for non-public utility generators.
Finally, if QFs and IPPs are able to flow through their costs of allowances
to their public utility purchasers, public utilities will argue that they must be
allowed to recover the costs of such allowances as an automatic pass-
through to their ratepayers. Unquestionably, state rate-setters will have
much to say on this question.
Ultimately, both the EPA and the FERC, as well as state public utility
regulators, may be called upon to provide remedies to the project financing
problems created by title IV. One attempt at preventing such problems from
occurring already is part of title IV. This is the allowance reserve, controlled
by the EPA, which is designed to accommodate the needs of IPPs and others
who cannot obtain allowances on reasonable terms through the market.63 It
seems unlikely, however, that this reserve, even if it temporarily addresses
the problem, can provide a permanent solution for a growing industry. Fur-
ther, this reserve only addresses the issues of availability, and no other provi-
sion of title IV offers clear answers to the questions of costs and their flow-
through to purchasers.
II. POSSIBLE STATE AND FEDERAL INITIATIVES ON ALLOWANCES
A number of potential federal and state legal authorities may be available
to ensure that non-public utility power developers have access to, and mech-
anisms to recoup, the cost of allowances. Following so soon after enactment
of the amendments, and years before promulgation of implementing regula-
tions, this section is necessarily somewhat speculative in nature.
A. Federal Authorities to Ensure the
Availability and Recoupability of Allowances
1. EPA Regulations
The amendments directing the EPA to promulgate regulations imple-
menting the allowance trading system" require the agency to take into ac-
count several objectives that are designed to enable the system to work as
Congress intended.65 These objectives appear to reflect Congressional
awareness of the need for rules that will facilitate access to allowances for
non-public utility developers, who are a primary force for competition in
electric power markets.
The EPA has a wide range of options to ensure that allowances are acces-
sible. These range from procedural rules governing the transferability of al-
63. 1990 Amendment § 416.
64. Id. § 403(b).
65. One of these objectives is that allowances be reasonably transferable, temporarily or
permanently, by purchase, lease, or otherwise. Another objective is that allowances not be
used to impede access to, or competition for, electric energy in any market.
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lowances to more intrusive measures that would encourage, if not require,
those who possess excess allowances to offer them for sale. One possible
difficulty with the latter approach is the potential conflict with the primary
role of the states in regulating the activities of franchised utilities.66 Con-
gress was well aware of this state role during its deliberations on the acid
rain title, and the amendments in fact provide that nothing in the statute is
intended to diminish the scope of state authority over retail power sales.67
Nonetheless, the amendments clearly assign primary responsibility over the
functioning of the allowance system to the EPA.68 Would or should the
EPA promulgate a mandatory offer for sale requirement for excess al-
lowances? Is the fact that no such requirement is present in the statute per-
suasive of the position that Congress did not intend it to exist? These are
critically important questions, the answers to which are, at this time, highly
uncertain.
Another area where the EPA may feel pressure to protect the non-public
utility generator involves the recoupability of allowance purchase costs.
Even if allowances are available, and at a reasonable price, non-public utility
project developers will be looking for mechanisms to flow through the costs
of obtaining such allowances.
Rulemaking by the EPA is unlikely to address this issue for at least two
reasons. First, the issue of whether the prices that public utilities pay for
non-public utility power include amounts for allowance costs directly impli-
cates the ratemaking jurisdiction of the FERC and the state utility commis-
sions as set out in the Federal Power Act69 (FPA) and PURPA. 70 The
Amendments give the EPA no ratemaking authority, nor do they amend the
FPA or PURPA to diminish the ratemaking jurisdiction of regulators under
those statutes. Second, while the EPA is responsible for promulgating rules
to protect the liquidity, integrity, and fairness of the allowance trading mar-
ket, flow-through of allowance purchase costs is clearly a post-market issue.
So it seems fair to conclude that flow-through would be more appropriately
addressed under the statutes mentioned above.7 1
2. Possible Regulation by the FERC
In recent years the FERC, under authority of the FPA,72 has pursued a
policy of encouraging the development of non-public utility electric genera-
66. See infra text accompanying notes 82-88.
67. 1990 Amendment § 403(f).
68. See generally 1990 Amendment § 403 (generally allocating responsibility over allow-
ance system to EPA).
69. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a, 797-800 (Supp. 1990).
70. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978).
71. See infra text accompanying notes 71-87.
72. The FPA establishes the standard that rates charged for sales of electricity for resale
must be "just and reasonable," and requires the FERC to enforce this standard. Pursuant to
this statutory directive, utilities other than QFs must obtain FERC approval to institute new
rates or increase existing rates. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(d). The agency also possesses the power to
investigate sua sponte or upon complaint, the justness and reasonableness of existing rates. 16
U.S.C. § 824(e)(a). Finally, the FERC has general rulemaking authority to carry out these
responsibilities and has exercised it on numerous occasions.
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tion, primarily through a series of decisions holding that sales by independ-
ent power projects to public utilities need not be based strictly upon cost-of-
service principles applicable to public utilities.73 The argument for this re-
laxed rate treatment is that the purchaser is not a captive customer, and
therefore presumably would not pay an excessive or oppressive rate. 74
Could the FERC, consistent with its pro-competitive policy, take action
under the FPA to ensure that allowances are available to non-public utility
generators? Probably. Will the FERC so act? Probably not. Acting under
authority of the FPA,75 the FERC could make explicit its view that the
competition provided by non-public utility generators is in the public inter-
est and, more specifically, helps to keep wholesale rates at the lowest level
consistent with adequate supplies for the ultimate benefit of consumers.
Since allowances will be necessary for non-public utility generators to oper-
ate, the hoarding of these allowances by utilities would be contrary to the
public interest and subject to FERC regulation. 76
The FERC would probably be hesitant to act to ensure the liquidity of
allowances if only because the Amendments grant to the EPA primary re-
sponsibility at the federal level for creating and maintaining a competitive
marketplace. 77 Further, state public utility commissions exercise jurisdic-
tion over public utility planning and construction to meet the demand for
electric power service. 78 Allowances probably will be classified by such com-
73. See supra note 55.
74. See FERC Docket No. RM88-4-00, IV F.E.R.C. Statutes & Regulations 32,456 at
32,109-114 (March 16, 1988).
75. 16 U.S.C. § 825(h) (Supp. 1990).
76. The amendments set up a scenario that is rife with antitrust implications: one set of
competitors is granted possession and control of allowances, that another set of competitors
needs to purchase in order to compete against them. Congress was cognizant of the anticom-
petitive potential inherent in this situation. See 1990 Amendment § 403(i). Accordingly, Con-
gress provided some help in the form of auctions and EPA sales that would allow developers
the option of purchasing a small number of allowances not owned by the utilities. See 1990
Amendment § 416. The vast majority of allowances, however, will be owned by public utilities
and the way they utilize these allowances will determine who will build new power plants in
the future.
Federal antitrust law applies to electric public utilities, and the regulation of their affairs by
federal and state authorities does not, in itself, provide a shield against antitrust liability if
electric public utilities engage in anticompetitive practices. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. U.S.,
410 U.S. 366, 374-75 (1973). Nothing in the amendments changes this law. There are many
antitrust precedents potentially available to non-public utility developers and a full treatment
of them is beyond the scope of this article. A more practical consideration regarding this area
is appropriate here.
Although it is not unlikely that a case may be brought by either a developer or the govern-
ment under the antitrust statutes, and that a useful precedent may eventually emerge, as a
practical matter antitrust enforcement probably will not serve as the primary tool for most
non-public utility project developers. Many developers are relatively small business concerns
for whom the prospect of challenging a public utility in court would be daunting. Further,
most projects have a relatively small "widow of opportunity" during which they must be
planned, financed, and constructed. The huge expense and protracted nature of antitrust pro-
ceedings would therefore not provide a suitable remedy. In the face of public utility ob-
stinance, the fact that a cause of action could be brought in federal court under the antitrust
statute is likely to be of nothing more than theoretical interest.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 65-76.
78. See infra text accompanying notes 82-88.
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missions as an asset relevant to meeting public utilities' service requirements,
and state regulators will therefore have a great deal to say about how al-
lowances are utilized. Any FERC action on allowance availability could put
it in conflict with state regulators.
FERC would be on firmer jurisdictional turf addressing the flow-through
issue, but the problems that it will face are likely to be extraordinarily
knotty. The question will be presented as to the justness and reasonableness
of rates, including amounts for the purchase of allowances necessary to gen-
erate the power under the contract. FERC will be pressed to rule that non-
public utility developers may recoup costs that are mandated by federal law
from their public utility purchasers.
For non-public utility plants that are QFs, the flow-through issue would
be framed in terms of avoided costs, the standard for public utility purchase
prices under PURPA. 79 SO 2 allowance costs are avoided by a public utility
that purchases power from a QF, as opposed to generating its own, or
purchasing from another public utility.80 The problem that arises is that the
purchasing utility may have been the seller of allowances to the QF. If one
purpose of the amendments is to give public utilities a profit incentive to
create excess allowances,81 requiring such utilities to finance purchases of
allowances by QFs appears to undercut that incentive.
B. State Authorities
Electric public utilities are under a legal obligation to provide electric
power to all those who request it in their franchised service territory,8 2 and
have a concomitant duty to meet projected growth in demand by planning
for and acquiring additional resources.83 State laws and precedents impose
these obligations and duties, and state regulatory commissions enforce
them.84
Acquisition of new resources to meet growth in demand is perhaps the
most difficult issue presently faced by public utilities, as evidenced by the
unfortunate experience of the last two decades in which the industry was
forced to write off billions of dollars invested in plant capacity that was
either not needed or constructed over budget.85
In an effort to avoid repeating this experience, public utilities and regula-
tors in most large states have adopted a policy of least-cost planning.8 6 This
is the notion that a public utility should consider a full range of options in
79. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304.
80. S. REP. No. 228 at 303.
81. See supra text accompanying note 59.
82. See D. MUCHOW & W. MOGEL, ENERGY LAW AND TRANSACTIONS §§ 2.01 to
2.02(2)(b) (1990).
83. See id. § 2.01(2).
84. Id. § 4.01.
85. Id. § 4.02(b); see FERC Docket No. RM88-4-00, IV F.E.R.C. Statutes & Regula-
tions 32,456 at 32,105, 106 (March 16, 1988).
86. See D. MURCHOW & W. MOGEL, supra note 82, at §§ 2.01, 4.02(3)(e)(1990).
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planning for projected growth, as opposed to automatically building new
plants, and should also pursue the most cost-effective option first.
To implement least-cost planning, many states have adopted competitive
bidding programs,8 7 which are in essence requests for proposals for new ca-
pacity. These proposals typically elicit bids from developers of non-public
utility projects. The public utility compares the bids, evaluates them against
the option of building its own capacity, and then chooses the overall best
option. Clearly, the ability of competitive bidding to ferret out the best pos-
sible alternative of meeting increased demand is grounded upon attracting
the widest possible universe of qualified bidders. This result will only occur
if there are assurances that a proposed project can actually be financed, con-
structed and operated. This in turn depends upon the developer being as-
sured of the necessary number of allowances and of the ability to flow the
costs of such allowances through to the purchaser. A satisfactory solution to
the allowance issue for non-public utility developers is a necessity if the
least-cost planning strategy is to remain workable.
State regulators have ample regulatory power to resolve this issue. They
possess plenary jurisdiction over the structure and activities of electric public
utilities in order to fulfill their statutory responsibility to assure adequate,
reliable and reasonably priced electric power service for consumers.88
Strong arguments can be made that state commissions should invoke their
authority to preserve the vitality of least-cost planning by guaranteeing that
non-public utility projects that supply or bid to supply power for resale to
consumers have access to allowances generated by regulated public utilities.
Additionally, state commissions could establish a policy that the purchase
cost of allowances is a legitimate and prudent expense and may be flowed
through in rates to ultimate customers. The latter point would be comple-
mentary to a potential FERC policy providing that allowance purchase costs
incurred by a QF project should be included in the rate paid by the public
utility purchaser. As with a possible FERC policy, a state requirement al-
lowing the cost of allowances to be flowed through appears to threaten the
public utility's incentive to produce excess allowances.
How state commissions will treat allowances is, of course, an open ques-
tion. It seems that some action along these lines is necessary to preserve for
ratepayers the competitive benefits of a robust non-public utility power in-
dustry. To the extent state regulators are committed to this approach in
meeting demand growth in their states, and indications are that their com-
mitment is strong, it seems probable that they will act forcefully. Whether
state action to ensure the availability of allowances for intra-state generators
would necessarily foster the goals of the Amendments, however, is unclear.
The actions of individual states might instead impair the fluidity of the al-
lowance market as each state seeks to ensure a dependable supply of al-
lowances for in-state projects.
87. Id. § 4.02(4)(b)(iii).
88. See id. § 4.01.
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II. CONCLUSION
The emissions allowances purchase requirement for new power generating
plants presents difficult issues that cut across the policies of different stat-
utes, and fall, at least partly, within the jurisdiction of a number of expert
federal and state agencies. Further complicating the task of making the al-
lowance program work is the reality that the agencies possess mandates that
may not be entirely consistent with one another, and that the agencies may
lack the authority to make all the adjustments necessary to prevent the new
acid deposition program from causing a dislocation in the financing of new
QFs and IPPs. Fully defining and addressing issues raised by the allowance
program should be a major priority of these agencies in order to prevent the
enactment of the acid rain policy from becoming a de facto repeal of an
emerging, and thus far successful, pro-competitive electric power policy.
